The Bay of Bengal, as a connecting maritime zone in the Indo-Pacific, has historically been a hub of global trade and imperial power. Today, it converges the three major economies of China, India, and ASEAN, making it a focal point of global politics and economics. Under the influence of the Indo-Pacific strategy, the strategic interests of major powers intersect, collide, and create friction here, affecting the relationships among regional and extra-regional states as well as non-state actors. This has turned the Bay of Bengal into a critical arena for competition over energy, resources, shipping routes, and cultural influence. Both regional and extra-regional states, along with non-state actors, have increased their attention and engagement in regional affairs, driving the development of security cooperation mechanisms in the Bay of Bengal.

Research trends include country-specific studies and regional studies. The former focuses on the domestic politics of regional states, maritime governance, non-traditional security threats, or the strategic adjustments of extra-regional powers toward the Bay of Bengal and the responses of regional states. The latter examines regional security governance and institutional development, covering issues such as maritime boundary delimitation, infrastructure construction, counterterrorism, fisheries governance, and related great-power competition, participation models, interactions, impacts, and shifts in governance paradigms. Additionally, some cross-regional studies explore the development of regional initiatives, inter-regional coordination, and macro-regional governance.

Existing research has limitations, primarily due to the narrow scope of analyzed cases—mostly BIMSTEC—and a constrained understanding of regional security cooperation mechanisms, failing to emphasize how to expand participation, broaden governance issues, and extend cooperation levels. Regional cooperation should be situated within the broader context of global governance, leveraging cross-regional collaboration to overcome power struggles, conflicting interests, and ideological differences in regional cooperation. While existing studies focus on the governance roles of extra-regional powers, framing cooperation on traditional and non-traditional issues as networked societal governance, in reality, the roles of extra-regional powers like the U.S. and Japan exhibit dual attributes—both driving development and creating obstacles—which exceed the explanatory scope of networked governance and require new perspectives such as great-power coordination.

Great-power coordination, originating from the 19th-century "Concert of Europe," advocates a cross-regional approach that links regional and global levels, adhering to norms and rules of "consistency, legitimacy, accountability, inclusiveness, and self-restraint" in regional security cooperation mechanisms. Tacit cooperation and "silent" coordination are common in great-power interactions. This framework not only provides theoretical support for cross-regional cooperation but also offers a new perspective to understand the contradictory governance roles of extra-regional powers. This paper examines the background, content, driving forces, and obstacles of the Bay of Bengal’s regional security cooperation mechanisms, exploring future pathways and China’s potential role.

1. Background and Content of the Bay of Bengal’s Regional Security Cooperation Mechanisms

The background and content of these mechanisms involve traditional and non-traditional security threats, including maritime boundary disputes, great-power strategic competition, arms races, counterterrorism challenges, marine ecological fragility, illegal maritime migration and human trafficking, piracy and armed robbery risks, illegal fishing, and transnational security threats. Key mechanisms include: SAARC’s cooperative centers (1985), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA, 1995), the South Asia Growth Quadrangle (later BBIN, 1997), the Information Sharing Centre under ReCAAP (2004), the BOBLME project (2012), BIMSTEC (2017), and the Indian-led IFC-IOR (2018). Other initiatives include minilateral cooperation (e.g., India-Japan-U.S. trilateral dialogue and QUAD), joint coordination (e.g., the Indian Ocean Security Treaty and CORPAT multilateral exercises), and forums like IONS, GD, RD, and IOC, aimed at fostering regional economic-technical cooperation, connectivity projects, and multilateral security collaboration to enhance responses to transnational threats.

2. Driving Forces Behind the Bay of Bengal’s Regional Security Cooperation Mechanisms

The U.S. has deepened its involvement through military deterrence and the "Indo-Pacific Strategy," strengthening maritime security ties with littoral states and forging non-treaty alliances with India, enhancing military aid and defense cooperation. Japan advances economic and military-security strategies, investing in infrastructure and expanding its military presence. China promotes non-traditional security cooperation via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and connectivity projects while deepening infrastructure and energy collaboration with littoral states. India pursues a comprehensive strategy, reinforcing ties with neighbors, investing in ports, and seeking regional leadership. Smaller littoral states employ diplomatic balancing and soft balancing to advance security mechanisms, while non-state actors like NGOs and think tanks inject new momentum by proposing initiatives and fostering cooperative discourse.

3. Obstacles to the Development of the Bay of Bengal’s Regional Security Cooperation Mechanisms

First, governance fragmentation and compartmentalization are acute, driven by great-power competition (e.g., U.S.-Japan efforts to counter China, India’s quest for exclusive dominance) and divergent priorities in traditional vs. non-traditional security (zero-sum competition vs. win-win cooperation). Second, governance uncertainty and internal contradictions arise from complex interactions (e.g., China-India-U.S. dynamics, extra-regional power involvement) and disparities in governance concepts, capacities, and issue preferences, hindering unified action. Littoral states’ violations of international law—such as detaining and punishing fishermen in exclusive economic zones—and unchecked overfishing exacerbate challenges. Overall, the mechanisms face hurdles from great-power rivalry, fragmentation, unpredictability, and internal discord.

4. Future Development of the Mechanisms and China’s Role

Strategies to enhance governance include adopting a "regional mechanisms + extra-regional powers/new issues" approach to boost institutional vitality and substantive progress. Regional states should balance great-power maritime competition with governance responsibilities while leveraging non-state actors’ strengths. Top-level design should follow a "weak mechanisms → strong mechanisms → community" trajectory, promoting inter-regional synergy—e.g., bilateral alignment of national initiatives, a "Three Bays" economic corridor, and integrating BIMSTEC with the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism.

Governance innovation should harness great-power coordination to foster regional harmony. As an emerging power, China should lead coordination under frameworks like "China-India+" and "China-Japan+," alleviating India’s strategic distrust, maintaining pragmatic cooperation with Japan, and demonstrating responsible leadership. China must understand smaller states’ strategic choices, mitigate negative impacts, and advance non-traditional security cooperation to bolster multilateral mechanisms.

5. Concluding Remarks

Uncertainty persists in the Bay of Bengal’s security landscape, with potential U.S.-Japan-India strategic tensions, though India and Japan will likely strengthen security ties with the U.S. while engaging China economically. China-Japan third-party cooperation may grow, and China-India collaboration could intensify. China’s strong cooperation intent with littoral states carries strategic risks, such as U.S. military activities threatening its maritime routes. Mechanism development hinges on U.S.-China strategic competition, littoral states’ domestic-foreign balancing acts, and extra-regional powers’ exclusion of China. The Bay of Bengal is poised for stability, with shared great-power interests favoring peaceful dispute resolution, while littoral states navigate great-power rivalry.