Regional Issue | 更新时间:2026-01-26
How Does the Middle Class Lead to Political Disorder? -An Analysis of Modernization Path Reconstruction in Thailand's Institutional Context (129)
车孟书 ,  胡云    作者信息&出版信息
Country and Area Studies   ·   2026年1月26日   ·   2026年 10卷 第1期  
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I. The Problem: The Paradox of the Relationship Between Thailand's Middle Class and Political Stability

This section explores the paradoxical relationship between Thailand's middle class and political stability. Traditional theory posits that the middle class is the cornerstone of social stability, but scholars like Huntington argue that during modernization, the middle class can become a source of political instability. Since the 1960s, Thailand's rapid economic growth created the "Asian Tiger Cub" economic miracle, and industrialization fostered a modern middle class. However, despite the increasing proportion of middle-income groups, Thailand's political stability index remains far below the global average, indicating that the expansion of middle-class political participation has not brought the expected political stability but rather a tendency to undermine it. This article aims to define Thailand's middle class, incorporate institutional factors into the modernization trajectory, construct an analytical framework for middle-class-induced political disorder, and empirically examine its causal logic to forecast Thailand's political stability.

II. Conceptual Definition and Literature Review

First, the concept of Thailand's middle class is defined, highlighting its complexity and the difficulty of strict scientific delineation. Thailand's middle class emerged during the industrialization of the 1960s, and as political participation expanded, its analytical context shifted from an economic concept to a special variable encompassing sociological and political semantics. Thailand's middle class can be divided into upper-middle and lower-middle strata: the former includes urban white-collar workers and intellectuals, while the latter comprises urban salaried families and rural affluent farmers. Next, the section reviews research on Thailand's middle class and political stability, summarizing three dominant analytical paradigms—sociological, institutionalist, and power-structural. The sociological paradigm focuses on social context and mechanisms shaping middle-class behavior; the institutionalist paradigm emphasizes institutions' role in molding group political behavior; and the power-structural paradigm examines political interest groups in class conflict. However, these paradigms are one-sided, failing to deeply analyze economic factors behind social contradictions or grasp the institutional and cultural contexts significantly influencing Thailand's middle-class participation. Thus, this article takes Thailand's modernizing middle class as its logical starting point, incorporating the "representative democracy with the King as head of state" to reveal the reasons behind the middle class's creation of a uniquely Thai phenomenon.

III. An Explanatory Framework for Thailand's Middle Class and Political Instability

This section explores the relationship between Thailand's middle class and political instability, proposing an explanatory framework. The formation of the middle class is closely tied to modernization, where economic development and material progress foster its emergence and shape its values. The behavioral dynamics of Thailand's middle class profoundly influence national politics, with modernization and institutional factors being key to explaining its destabilizing role. Economic growth and distribution models shape middle-class characteristics, yet modernization's material accumulation has not led to regional equity. Thailand's middle class emerged alongside national economic and social development five-year plans, with urban-centered industrial growth attracting foreign direct investment, creating regional imbalances and significant disparities in middle-class distribution. The middle class's materialist values and interest-based logic manifest politically as ambivalence and vacillation toward democracy. The logic of modernization and middle-class disorder necessitates institutional consideration: Thailand's King-centered system heavily influences national politics, exacerbating inequality in resource and power adjustments. The middle class aligns with conservative elites to uphold the traditional monarchical framework, rejecting electoral governance, leading to social polarization and division.

IV. The "Modernized" Middle Class: The Origin of Thailand's Political Disorder

This section delves into the political participation of Thailand's middle class during modernization and its impact on political disorder. It argues that middle-class instability is amplified within the political system, causing disorder. Analyzing the 1992 "Black May" uprising, the 2005 "Yellow Shirt" movement, and the decade-long "Red-Yellow" conflict reveals a logical progression from middle-class ambivalence to division and disorder. In 1992, Bangkok's urban middle class protested against military government corruption and political interference, but the conflict ended after royal intervention, showing reliance on monarchical mediation. From 2001–2006, Thaksin's pro-lower-class policies split the middle class, with the upper-middle opposing him, sparking the "Yellow Shirt" movement and a coup. From 2007–2014, "Red-Yellow" clashes intensified polarization, merging middle-class division with elite struggles, leading to disordered political participation. The 2014 coup again demonstrated how middle-class polarization undermines Thailand's political stability.

V. Conclusion

Against the backdrop of the 50th anniversary of Sino-Thai diplomatic relations in 2025, a deep examination of Thailand's politics is crucial for bilateral ties. Thailand's political system is unique in its strong, independent power structure, where elite groups remain entrenched, creating a "political-economic separation." Modernization's uneven economic development has fueled the rise of the upper-middle class, exacerbating social stratification. The upper-middle class concentrates in urban hubs like Bangkok, forming an elite stratum, while the lower-middle class and rural groups lack upward mobility, excluded from the system. Modernization's "economy-first" values drive groups to seek non-institutional solutions when interests are threatened. The old political system exploits modernization-induced class divisions to reinforce itself during democratization. Modernization intensifies "relative deprivation," which political institutions convert into conflict, trapping the nation in cycles of turmoil. In countries with entrenched power structures, modernization's imbalances deepen class divisions, and authoritarianism exploits class contradictions as a driver of instability. When examining the middle class and political stability, attention must be paid to modernization's unequal distribution and value issues, alongside unique national institutional contexts. Only when economic development transforms power structures and achieves equitable redistribution will the middle class become the backbone of Thailand's political stability.

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