This study examines the role of Chinese-funded livelihood projects in Africa in promoting socio-economic development, using the Lamu Coal-Fired Power Plant project in Kenya as a case study. It outlines the project background, cooperation model, and the process leading to the project's suspension due to opposition from local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), aiming to analyze stakeholder interactions and potential risks.

I. Analytical Framework: Two-Level Games in Transnational Networks and the Measurement of Winning Sets

A two-level game analytical framework within transnational networks is constructed, introducing the concept of the "winning set." This framework transforms international and domestic levels into inter-network and intra-network interactions, focusing on four network groups including Kenyan NGOs to explore their impact on game outcomes and the reasons for the failure to reach an agreement. The size of the winning set is measured by five indicators: tolerance for the status quo, heterogeneity of interests, tolerance for divergence, leader autonomy, and strategic preferences, which influence the level of agreement support and negotiation gains.

II. Network Groups in the Lamu Project Game

Based on the theory of two-level games in transnational networks, the network groups involved in the Lamu project game are meticulously categorized and analyzed along two dimensions: "international-domestic" and "official-nonofficial participation." Regarding Kenyan local NGOs, represented by the de-coal movement coalition, organizations such as Save Lamu and the Katiba Institute, with funding and assistance from Western international NGOs (INGOs), consistently opposed the Lamu project from its financing stage through community engagement, legal advocacy, lobbying the government and international organizations. They successfully influenced key decision-makers like the Lamu County Council and Kenya's former Minister of Environment and utilized platforms such as international conferences to amplify their influence. Within the Western-supported INGO network groups, organizations like AJWS, Natural Justice, and Greenpeace closely collaborated with Kenyan local NGOs to advance the de-coal movement, while foundations like the Ford Foundation provided financial backing. Meanwhile, Western governments held complex stances: the Norwegian and Swedish embassies explicitly opposed the project, and some U.S. congressmen linked it to a "debt trap." However, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya and General Electric initially supported the project before withdrawing their investments due to various factors. The Kenyan government public sector, as the project's initiator and ultimate decision-maker, exhibited varying behavioral choices due to internal interest disparities—from promoting project approval to terminating it following environmental lawsuits and investor withdrawal. Different levels of government agencies were interconnected throughout the approval process. Intergovernmental international organizations provided legitimacy for NGOs' environmental advocacy, indirectly influencing government attitudes. For instance, UN agencies requested the Kenyan government to suspend the project, and the African Development Bank altered its funding stance after UNESCO expressed concerns.

III. Reversal of the Lamu Project Agreement by NGOs' Environmental Advocacy: An Explanation Based on Winning Set Assessment

This chapter analyzes the reasons behind the reversal of the Lamu project agreement by NGOs' environmental advocacy through winning set assessment. In terms of tolerance for the status quo, Kenyan local NGOs had the highest tolerance due to their focus on the project's multifaceted impact on local communities, leading to their resistance. INGOs and Western networks, along with international organization networks, had moderate tolerance, but opposition prevailed. The Kenyan government public sector network had the lowest tolerance, as the project was crucial for national development. Regarding heterogeneity of interests, the Kenyan government public sector network exhibited the highest level, with diverging interests between central and local governments, among others. INGOs and Western networks, as well as international organization networks, showed moderate heterogeneity but ultimately reached consensus. Kenyan local NGO networks had the lowest heterogeneity, with high internal interest homogeneity. On tolerance for divergence, Kenyan local NGO networks and international organization networks scored the highest, with internal consensus or loose alignment. INGOs and Western networks were moderate, with internal divisions within the U.S. government. The Kenyan government public sector network had the lowest tolerance, needing internal consistency to advance the project. Concerning leader preferences, Kenyan local NGO networks, INGOs, and Western government networks leaned toward non-cooperative actions. International organization networks had moderate preferences, leaving room for cooperation. The Kenyan government public sector network had the strongest preference for cooperation. Synthesizing these variables, the Kenyan local NGO network had the smallest winning set range but significant bargaining power. The Kenyan government public sector network had the largest range but was in a passive position. The choices of the other two groups affected negotiation capabilities, ultimately enabling NGOs to reverse the project agreement.

IV. Risk Identification and Strategic Responses

This section delves into the contradictions between national development and environmental governance in Kenya, as reflected in the suspension of the Lamu power plant project, and its implications for China-Africa cooperation. From the Kenyan government's perspective, national development far outweighs the growth of civil society. The suspension of the Lamu project has led to severe power issues and economic losses for Kenya, missing opportunities to drive industrialization and improve environmental governance. Meanwhile, African local NGOs, influenced by colonial history and Western environmental ideologies, exhibit high sensitivity to environmental issues and align closely with Western INGOs in philosophy. Against this backdrop, Chinese enterprises investing in and constructing projects in Africa need to mitigate social risks by shifting towards clean energy and smart power systems. Chinese social organizations should actively engage in Africa, strengthen communication and mutual trust with African local NGOs, and assist Chinese enterprises in assessing project social impacts and environmental risks. Chinese companies should proactively participate in environmental impact assessments for projects in Africa, adopt the highest standards to counter Western pressure, prioritize local African environmental legislation and environmental-social risks, actively engage in community development, respect local environmental governance demands, and collaborate with domestic technical departments on cultural heritage protection to enhance their image and influence in Africa.