This paragraph analyzes the impact of social stratification and polarization on the democratic system in the United States following the 2008 financial crisis, focusing on the rise of working-class voters as a key political force and their decisive influence on the 2024 election outcome. The study notes that the economic policy of Trump's second term centers on a "worker-oriented" logic, systematically addressing working-class demands through comprehensive tariffs, targeted tax reforms, and strict immigration controls, though inherent contradictions within the policy framework remain unresolved.

I. "Working-Class Voters" in American Electoral Politics

This section first defines two core concepts in the American context: the "middle class" and "working-class voters." The former is primarily an economic-social status concept measured by income, characterized by high ambiguity and heterogeneity, mainly reflecting a group's relative position in the local income distribution. The latter possesses stronger political attributes, referring mainly to American workers with voting eligibility who participate in elections, measured by educational attainment and occupational characteristics—a political mobilization unit based on occupation-education. The two differ significantly in measurement logic and economic policy demands: "working-class voters" emphasize an "economic victim" narrative, while the "middle class" emphasizes economic stability and "American Dream" identification. Trump leveraged this tension to reshape the Republican Party's voter base, integrating worker interests into economic, foreign policy, and immigration issues to garner support—a strategy that proved particularly effective among working-class voters without college degrees and minority working-class voters. Subsequent sections review the research trajectory of American workers' political engagement, noting that Trump exploited the social backdrop of manufacturing decline and working-class economic discontent to construct interest-based associations through populist narratives of "America First" and "Protecting American Workers." His first term implemented tariff protection, tax cuts, and other measures, attributing social problems to globalization policies. During the 2024 campaign, he promised larger-scale deportations, tax cuts, and at least 10% new import tariffs, using a policy combination of tax reform, tariffs, and immigration to strengthen the systematic supply of "worker-oriented" economic policies, driving the Republican Party's transformation from "identity mobilization" toward "systematic supply" in its "worker-oriented" shift.

II. Interaction Between Trump and Working-Class Voters Before and After His Re-election

This section examines the triple interaction mechanism between Trump and working-class voters during the 2024 election campaign and his second term. During the electoral mobilization phase, Trump constructed a multi-ethnic working-class alliance through a triple narrative strategy: first, shaping himself as a spokesperson for "the forgotten Americans," promising to reduce inflation and cut federal spending to respond to the economic anxiety of middle- and low-income workers; second, strengthening an anti-globalization "victim" narrative, using high tariffs and manufacturing reshoring promises to win support in "Rust Belt" swing states; third, linking strict immigration controls to worker rights protection, catering to this group's psychological resistance to foreign immigrants. During the governance response phase, Trump translated campaign promises into concrete policy supply: implementing "worker-oriented" tax reform through the "One Big Beautiful Bill," including corporate investment incentives and targeted deductions for tips, overtime income, and seniors; constructing a global radical tariff system to promote reindustrialization through "reciprocal tariffs"; and strictly controlling immigration through deportation of illegal immigrants and tightening H-1B visas to ensure native workers' priority employment. During the feedback and re-mobilization phase, as tariff cost transfers, labor shortages, and inflation pressures emerged, Trump's approval rating fell from 48% at the beginning of his term to 38% one year later. To address the midterm elections, the government made strategic adjustments: terminating some legally risky tariff measures and imposing temporary import tariffs instead, accelerating tax reform benefit realization to expand refund coverage, increasing seasonal worker visa quotas to alleviate labor shortages, while continuing the "blame Biden" discourse strategy to consolidate the working-class voter base.

III. Effectiveness Evaluation of the "Worker-Oriented" Economic Policy in Trump's Second Term

This section evaluates the actual effects and inherent limitations of the "worker-oriented" economic policy in Trump's second term. At the effectiveness level, the policy achieved certain progress in promoting capital market prosperity and providing voters with a perception of being "prioritized": large-scale tax cuts stimulated consumption and investment in the short term, with the average individual refund reaching $3,571 in March 2026; corporate income tax was reduced to 21% with accompanying R&D and fixed asset depreciation deductions; real GDP grew at an average of 2.5% in the first three quarters of 2025; and manufacturing added 15,000 new jobs in March 2026, achieving positive growth for the first time in three years. Tariff policies brought approximately $287 billion in revenue to the federal treasury, nearly triple that of 2024. Immigration controls were significantly tightened, with asylum application approval rates at only 7%, nearly 500,000 deportation orders issued in fiscal year 2025, and over 3 million illegal immigrants leaving the country. However, these achievements were accompanied by significant negative effects: GDP growth plummeted to 0.5% in the fourth quarter of 2025; tariffs caused households to spend an additional $1,700 annually on average; the goods trade deficit still hit new highs; and bankruptcy filings increased 10.6% year-on-year by the end of September 2025. Immigration policy support dropped from 45% to 39%, and Latino voter support plummeted from 48% to 22%.

At the limitation level, the section analyzes from three dimensions. First, tax reform policies failed to precisely address working-class voter needs, creating a disconnect between "worker-first narrative" and "rich-first essence": the overtime income tax credit only benefited middle- to high-income overtime workers meeting Fair Labor Standards Act definitions, with over 90% of American workers unable to benefit as they do not receive overtime pay; the child tax credit allowed families earning $400,000 to receive $2,200 per child, while families earning below $31,500 could receive at most $1,750, with approximately 17 million children receiving no credit at all, the majority being Black and Latino children; the Council of Economic Advisers even recommended that states increase sales taxes to eliminate corporate and personal income taxes, further burdening the working class, resulting in continued decline in support among Americans without college degrees, with white working-class voter support (49%) already below opposition (51%). Second, tariff policies failed to establish effective cost buffering mechanisms, with protectionist costs mainly borne by working-class voters: according to analysis, the proportion of tariff costs passed to consumers rose from 22% at three months to 55% at ten months; under the corporate-bearing model, wages would decline and capital stock decrease in the long term, while under the consumer-bearing model, living cost pressures would intensify with restricted investment and productivity growth, forcing working-class voters to bear inflation pressure and becoming the direct cause of declining approval ratings. Third, immigration policy failed to properly manage the benign competitive relationship between foreign immigrants and native workers: ignoring the reality that nearly 31 million immigrants contribute approximately 67% labor participation with 19.2% of the workforce, particularly in services, construction, and agriculture where they are heavily relied upon—with about one-third of construction workers being foreign immigrants; if the goal of deporting 4 million people by the end of 2028 is achieved, native worker employment would actually decrease by a net 861,000 jobs; the Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that deporting 8.3 million illegal immigrants would make 2028 GDP 7.4% lower than baseline levels, with insufficient labor supply triggering supply chain disruptions and business contraction, leaving native workers facing reduced working hours, job losses, and limited wage growth instead.

IV. Conclusion

This section analyzes the key role of working-class voters in American party politics, noting that Trump embedded economic policy within worker-oriented narratives to channel this group's discontent, but the combination of tax reform, tariff, and immigration policies failed to truly satisfy worker needs, with minimal policy results triggering voter skepticism; it also reveals that the Trump government still packages policy effectiveness through political performance and shifts economic responsibility, ultimately posing the question of whether working-class voters will continue to "pay the bill" for his policies.